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Contesting Property Rights: Towards an




It is widely recognized that institutions are embedded in social systems and that institutions as
well as social systems change over time. Several implications follow: First, institutions cannot be
described and analyzed without referring to the system in which they operate; conversely, a system
cannot be described without reference to its core institutions. Second, systems foster institutional
change and can breed new institutions. Third, institutional change can have systemic implications
and may even engender the formation of new systems. In short, the relation between institutions
and systems is characterized by complex interactions. A better understanding of the dynamics of
institutional change therefore necessitates a ynthesis of social system and institutional theories
and a re-direction of attention from institutions or systems to interdependencies between them.
This paper seeks to develop the building blocks for an integrated theory of social and institutional
change. Thematically it focuses on contested property rights. The paper argues that the scope
and limits of property rights are determined by the manner in which contests for control can be
resolved within a broader system, which may, but does not have to, be that of a nation state. A
comparative analysis of transnational property rights cases shall help shed light on the relation
between property rights institutions and the system that determines if and how they are realized.
These case studies serve as heuristics for generating insights about the dynamics of institutional
and systemic change.
KEYWORDS: institutional change, legal change, property rights
*1 would like to thank the participants at the Arthur M. Sackler Colloquium on 3-4 December 2010,
in particular my commentator, Barak Richman, as well as Tamara Lothian and Ralf Michaels for
helpful comments. Thanks also to William Alford and his students in the law and development
class at Harvard Law School where I first presented this paper for their questions and suggestions,
which led me to restate many ideas, hopefully to make them stronger. All remaining errors are
mine.
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I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years much progress has been made in analyzing
institutions, identifying those that appear to be critical for economic development,
and defining reform agendas for less developed countries to improve their
'institutional infrastructure'. The practical success of these reforms, however, has
been mixed, as reform programs either failed to trigger the expected market
response, or produced unexpected results. On the theoretical side it is also
becoming clear that institutional analyses do not sufficiently account for the
context in which institutions operate. Depending on the theory that is advanced,
this context comprises power politics, a country's legal tradition (legal origin), or
simply the accumulated institutional baggage of the past, which creates path
dependencies that are not easily reversed. Thus, the strong emphasis on
methodological individualism that has characterized rational choice theories and
their progeny in the literature on institutionalism has been relaxed over time. First,
institutions were added to the analysis of individual actor behavior in order to
understand the constraints under which they operate - with institutions being
identified as such constraints. Next came the insight that institutions are not
simply given or static, but that they change either in response to exogenous
shocks, or endogenously in a more gradual fashion. Closer inspection of the
processes of institutional change finally raised interest in the context in which
institutions operate, as it became clear that explanations for institutional change
cannot fully be accounted for by individual actions and existing institutional
constraints. The context metaphor, of course, can also be interpreted as a
reference to the broader social system, that is, the structures that determine the
collective reproduction of allocative and authoritative resources in a given system
Layder (1989).1 These structures may differ across time and space, which
suggests a need not only for comparative institutional analysis, but for
comparative system analysis, and indeed, for a synthesis between the two.
In short, the path from autonomous rational actor theory has led us back to
inquiries into systems and the relation between individual choice and social
systems - i.e. the old and familiar problem of methodological dualism. The
challenge then is to advance our understanding of the relation between actors,
institutions, and systems. This is not only a theoretical challenge; it is also critical
if we want to improve the effectiveness of institutional reforms both within and
across countries. Comparative analysis of institutional reform projects suggests
that institutional reforms without consideration of the social and political
structures in which institutions are embedded rarely produce the desired results
1 There are obviously many ways of defining social systems - some of which would disregard any
difference between institutions and systems that is the analytical starting point of this paper. These
issues are further explored in section 2 below.
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Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003). They may be entirely ineffective; they
may be dormant for years and become effective only later on; or they may
produce unexpected effects Teubner (2001), some of them useful for the targeted
beneficiaries of reforms, but some not. In light of the empirically observable
diversity in outcomes of similar institutional reforms, one can hardly avoid the
conclusion that knowledge of institutions alone has little predictive power for the
effect they might have in different systems.
Adding context, however, is not sufficient. Instead, a conceptual leap is
required that combines the understanding of individual behavior, institutions, and
the processes of collective construction of these institutions within a broader
social system. Theories that ordain methodological individualism tend to conflate
individual action in response to incentives and constraints on one hand, and the
collective reproduction of these institutions and the system of social ordering of
which they are a part, on the other. Because these theories assume that all
individuals act as if they were autonomous, they over-estimate the impact of
specific institutional change - i.e. legal reforms, or the creation of a new
regulatory or administrative organization - on collective behavior. A more
realistic assessment of the impact of institutional change requires recognition that
collective behavior is not simply the sum of all individual responses that were
targeted by an institutional reform strategy, but of the collective response to such
reforms in light of existing norms, power structures and social relations, i.e. of the
system within which the reforms shall be realized. Dualistic theories have their
own, equally well-recognized problems. In particular, they tend to err on the side
of over-determining individual behavior by social structures.
The goal then is to recognize the importance of individual actions,
institutions and systems and to develop a theoretical framework that helps explain
how they relate to one another. This is a challenging task; this paper, therefore,
has the more modest goal of suggesting the building blocks for such a theory and
to do this against the background of recent advances in research on institutional
change. One important aspect of this effort in re-theorizing is to define and
thereby conceptualize the notion of institutions and systems.
In this paper I suggest the following definition of institutions: Institutions
are the space for contesting the scope of rights and responsibilities of stakeholders
with regards to an asset, entity or relation in an attempt to generate third party
support.2 This requires that the agreed scope of rights (output) and/or the process
by which these rights are defined (input) is deemed legitimate, i.e., that these
rights are accepted as binding even by those who might not agree with them.3
2 Note that this definition of institutions is borrowed from Streeck and Thelen (2005) discussed
infra.
3 The term "legitimate" is derived from the Latin legitimare, or to make something lawful. While
legitimacy can be conceptualized in various ways - both descriptively and normatively - most
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Systems comprise multiple institutions that accept as binding the balancing of
their status within the broader system, because the balancing act is deemed
legitimate for reasons related to the authority in charge, the process followed, or
the outcome produced.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses recent
developments in the literature on institutionalism, in particular the increasing
recognition of the importance of context for understanding processes of
institutional change and the impact of such change on observable outcomes.
Section III develops the building blocks for an integrated theory of institutions
and systems. Section IV applies these building blocks to an analysis of contested
property rights in a transnational context where the boundaries of systems and
institutions are more complex than in a nation state setting. Section V concludes.
II. Contextualizing Institutional Change - A Review of Existing Theories on
Institutional Change
This section discusses trends in recent literatures on institutions and institutional
change that have (re-) discovered the need to integrate the analysis of institutions
into a broader analysis of social, political or legal systems. The overview is meant
to be illustrative, not comprehensive. Specifically, we trace this development in
two prominent branches of the literatures on institutionalism - economic and
historical institutionalism.
The starting point for most discussions on institutionalism in the
economics literature remains Douglas North's definition that institutions are the
'rules of the game' that humans devise to constrain their actions North (1990).
These rules may be formal or informal. How informal rules are produced is not
further explained. The production of formal law is viewed as a function of the
state, i.e. of a centralized agent that is explicitly authorized with the task of norm
production. To achieve economic development, the state should not project a
vision of social goals or aspirations, but act as 'neutral arbiter' North (1990). This
essentially eliminates the normative aspect of the legal order; instead, formal law
is viewed as a production cost reducing infrastructure for rational economic
agents. Only few states, however, have achieved the status of neutral arbiter, a
share the notion that legitimacy justifies the exercise of power and authority. For a comprehensive
survey of political legitimacy, see Peter (2010).
' There is an extensive literature in sociology on social system theory. Different theorists identify
different factors as foundational for a system. Niklas Luhmann, for example, focuses on
communication and largely disregards actors Luhmann (1987); Talcot Parson emphasizes actions
as critical elements Parsons (1991); For Max Weber, governance through organizations is
constitutive of different social orders, each of which is characterized by distinct modes of social
ordering Weber (1980). The definition of systems used here is most closely related to Weber, even
though it abstracts from the highly descriptive historical forms of organizational ordering he uses.
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fact that North ascribes to the path dependence of institutional change. This
insight would seem to call for a deeper inquiry into the collective processes of the
reproduction of norms and practices. Such an analysis, however, lies outside the
conceptual framework employed, which remains firmly rooted in methodological
individualism.
Other institutional economists have departed from North's definition of
institutions. Masahiko Aoki has suggested that formal pronouncements of rules
are not institutions. Instead, they become institutions only if and when they
become part of the relevant actors' collective expectations Aoki (2001). This
insight acknowledges that the 'rules of the game' in North's terms are not simply
directions (like traffic signs) given to individual actors who then respond to them.
Instead, something else is required for most addressees to recognize these
directions as binding norms and to internalize them into their behavior. In a
similar vein, Avner Greif suggests that institutions are observable 'regularized
patterns of behavior' Greif (2006). This presupposes the internalization of norms
by a collective. Individuals may shape the development of institutions, but not all
individuals are equally influential for the behavior of others. Those with authority,
Greif suggests, are more likely to trigger change. When they deviate from
established patterns of behavior, they encourage others to follow suit. Implied in
this reasoning is that some individuals have authority while others don't. But what
explains authority? Because in Greif s view institutions are the product of
collective behavior (they are regularized patterns of behavior), they can hardly
also be the source of authority. Greif does not provide an easy answer to this
question and instead makes some broad references to history and culture Greif
(2006). The questions about how history shapes culture or culture shapes history
remain largely unanswered.
Arguably one of the most radical departures from the individual rational
actor framework from within the economics discipline has come from the
literature on legal origin La Porta et al. (1998; Glaeser and Shleifer (2002; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei (2008). The major discovery of this literature
has been that the content of legal rules is shaped largely by a country's legal
origin - that is, whether a country belongs to the common or the civil law family.
Legal origin in turn is determined by history, in particular by important junctures
in a country's political economy: countries with historical experiences of unrest
and political uncertainty are said to favor legal systems that vest central
lawmakers with substantial authority Djankov et al. (2003). In contrast, countries
that enjoyed greater political stability, according to the authors, have allowed
decentralized structures to evolve. They have therefore given greater deference to
individual rights and de-centralized control Glaeser and Shleifer (2002).
5 The classification of countries into common law and civil law systems is, of course, not their
making, but has a long history in comparative law analysis.
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While this literature grappled for a while with how to conceptualize 'legal
systems' or 'legal origin', in a review article that summarized its contribution for
the preceding ten years the leading proponents define legal origin as "a style of
social control over economic life" La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei (2008).
The major difference between common law and civil law systems, they argue, is
the common law's emphasis on markets and the civil law's bias for "state-
desired" allocations of resources. A flow chart in the same paper illustrates that in
their view legal origin determines the contents of legal rules, which in turn affect
economic outcome. To the extent that legal rules cause economic behavior -
which according to their regression analyses and their interpretation of the results
is the case - socio-political structures are outcome determinative. The authors
seek to avoid the implied fatalism of legal origin for policy makers by suggesting
that well designed interventions may bring about change notwithstanding the
strong structural impact of legal origin. They suggest, for example, that rules
designed to lower entry barriers for firms can stimulate economic development.
This not only ignores the possibility that such formal change may be easily
countered by informal substitutes Arrunada (2007),6 but ultimately defeats their
argument. If systems can be changed by changing rules of the game, then legal
origin loses much of its explanatory power Pistor (2009).
Differences aside, the approaches discussed so far suggest that
institutional change cannot be explained without reference to phenomena that lie
outside institutions and actors. Aoki and Greif go as far as identifying institutions
with observable behavior, or actually formed expectations. This conflates two
levels of analysis that for analytical purposes might better be kept apart. The
ability to distinguish the normative claim that is embodied in institutions on one
hand, and compliance with such claims on the other, is critical especially in the
realm of policy, where questions about the effect of interventions on behavioral
outcomes arise all the time. But even for purely descriptive purposes it seems
useful to distinguish between a norm and the behavior it generates.
Recent developments in historical institutionalism have sought to link
institutional change to system change and have thereby highlighted the
importance of analyzing the normative and distributional consequences of
institutional change. One strategy has been to create an explicit link between
institutions and social systems by defining institutions as "building blocks of
social order" Streeck and Thelen (2005), i.e. by conceptualizing them as 'mini
social orders'. In this account institutions are "mutually related rights and
obligation" that may be enforced by "calling upon a third party". Thus, an
institution is not any bilateral bargain, but rather only those mutually related
6 An example Arrunada (2007) cites is Afghanistan, which quickly ascended the ranking scale for
business friendliness by formally reducing the time it takes for new businesses to register. Yet,
most pre-existing barriers were simply moved to the post-registration phase.
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rights and obligations that can generate support by others and therefore become
enforceable. The strong normative connotation of this conceptualization of
institutions differentiates it from those of Aoki or Greif discussed above. For
Streeck and Thelen, legitimacy is the critical ingredient that links institutions to
social ordering. They invoke Max Weber, for whom the operation of
Herrschaftsverbdnde (translated as ruling organizations7 ) is rooted in the
legitimacy of authority. In fact, Streeck and Thelen suggest hat it is useful to
think of "institutions as regimes" (ibid at 13) that are "embedded in societal
context of supportive third parties that make for institutional legitimacy" (ibid).
Within this framework the impetus for institutional change comes not only from
the rule-maker, but also - and in the case of gradual institutional change,
primarily - from rule takers. Because institutions are never fully specified and
leave room for interpretation and contestation, rule takers can and do alter, morph
and transform rules. Indeed, in their view ongoing contestation is critical for rules
to retain their legitimacy over time.8
A somewhat different strategy for analyzing the relation between
institutions and social systems is to link institutional change to a typology of
human agency, which is derived from a typology of political systems. The starting
point for this analysis, as in the approach just discussed, is that institutions are
ambiguous, and "fraught with tensions" because of the distributional issues they
inevitably raise, and because of their inherent ambiguity or incompleteness
Mahoney and Thelen (2010). Once a rule has been pronounced, it sets in motion
multiple processes to establish its meaning and scope of application. Rather than
establishing definite rules of the game, institutions become the focal point for
contestation. The form this contestation takes, according to this view, depends on
the political context and the type of change agent. This agent may be an
insurrectionist, a symbiont, a subversive, or an opportunist. This typology builds
on the typology for institutional change Streeck and Thelen (2005) developed
earlier, in which they distinguished five modes of gradual institutional
transformation: displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion.9
7 Note that Streeck and Thelen refer to the translation by Gunther Roth (cited ibid at 13).
8 In a similar vein, the concept of the "rule of law" has been described as an inherently contested
concept. See Waldron (2002).
9 According to Mahoney and Thelen, insurrectionists and subversives do not seek to preserve
institutions. They are agents who prefer the immediate replacement of existing institutions
(displacement), or their gradual phasing out by putting in place alternative institutional
arrangements other actors can opt into. In contrast, symbionts and opportunists are more strongly
associated with drift and conversion, that is, with strategies of institutional change that preserve
existing institutions at least initially. By advocating a new interpretation of these institutions
(conversion) or by neglecting their maintenance (drift), these agents trigger change that might
ultimately prove as transformative as the more radical strategies of displacement and layering.
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The two approaches differ with respect to the relative importance they
place on (individual) human agency (Mahoney and Thelen) on one hand, and the
space within which collective processes of institutional contestation take place
(Streeck and Thelen). Nonetheless, they share a common understanding of the
relation between institutions and systems. Systems are made of institutions and
institutions set the stage for contests among individuals within that system.
Systems thus appear as relatively closed, and change tends to be generated at the
micro, or institutional level, rather than at the macro, or system level. In both
accounts, the system is more constant than institutions and creates constraints on
the process of institutional change - whether by shaping the type of 'change
agent' and the institutional strategies available to it, or the nature and scope of
contestation in an institutional regime. In this respect the theories are not
fundamentally different from the theories on economic institutionalism discussed
above. They too assume a single, closed system that comprises institutions and
actors; and they situate the locus for change at the micro-level of that system, at
the intersection of human agency and institutional constraints.
In what follows I will question whether the relation between systems and
institutions can be fully captured by this micro-macro relation within a closed
system - especially when the system is associated with the boundaries of the
nation state, as is typically assumed. That association is problematic as it neglects
the possibility that nation states can consist of multiple systems and that both
social systems and institutions may extend beyond national borders. The macro-
micro relation between institutions and systems also fails to explain how they
relate to one another. Moreover, it underestimates the possibility for institutions to
generate system change, and for systems to engender institutional change.
I will therefore argue that systems are open, not closed; that institutions
can interface with more than one system; and that what holds systems together is
not a natural hierarchy between micro-level institutions and the macro-level
system, but the legitimacy of the act of balancing the quest for primacy by
competing institutions. Note that the source of legitimacy need not be a central
authority as is implied by Weber's notion of ruling organizations. It may also be
the process of balancing or the outcome achieved.
This extended notion of legitimacy that is not directly tied to a single
authority takes account of the growing importance of modes of social ordering
that are not hierarchical but horizontal, and that derive legitimacy either from the
process they follow or the outcome they can produce. 10 An institutional regime is
part of a system to the extent that its stakeholders accept as binding the balancing
act between it and other institutional regimes that the system produces. If and
1o For an extensive discussion on input vs. output legitimacy, see Scharpf (1999).
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when this consensus no longer holds, the effectiveness of the institutional regime,
the broader system, or both, is compromised
III. Towards an Integrated Theory of Institutional and System Change
An integrated theory of institutional and system change needs to explain the
difference between institutions and systems, how they relate to one another, and
by what means. I begin with the institutional-regime-framework developed by
Streeck and Thelen. In this framework, institutional regimes are spaces of
contestation over allocative and authoritative resources with respect to a particular
issue - such as land, labor, firms, family, and so forth. A system comprises
multiple institutions or institutional regimes, but not necessarily in a hierarchical
fashion. Instead, an institutional regime can develop outside a given system and
can interface with more than one. It can have rule makers and rule takers different
from other institutional regimes, and from those found in the systems they seek to
affect. The metaphor of 'building blocks' Streeck and Thelen use for explaining
the link between institutions and systems thus appears to be too narrow. An
institutional regime is not necessarily a brick that, once installed, cannot be used
again for a different house. Instead, an institutional regime can create space for
norm contestation in and across multiple systems. The relation between
institutional regimes and systems is therefore better captured by a weaving pattern
than a pyramid.
This is true even in a world of Westphalian nation states with their
universal claim to ordering all aspects of social life. Newly created national laws
often overlapped and intersected with historically grown local or trade specific
forms of self-ordering. Globalization has amplified the trend towards multiple
overlapping governance regimes in which the state plays a helping hand, but over
which it does not have ultimate control. Challenger's to the state's claim to
governance include multinational enterprises that seek to level the playing field
across markets and national boundaries, as well as transnational 'non-
governmental organizations' (NGOs) that seek to call attention to human rights,
labor standards, and environmental issues across nation states. These transnational
institutional regimes tend to focus on output legitimacy and call into question the
credibility of national governments as arbiters across competing institutional
regimes. The framework of interfacing institutions within fields of social ordering
can also help to illuminate the interface between institutional regimes within a
national order. The civil rights movement in the US with its initial focus on
achieving equality for black Americans inspired the feminist movement, the
assertion of self-determination by native Americans, and eventually the gay and
lesbian movements. In all of these cases the mobilization of law and litigation to
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achieve greater equality had far reaching and arguably transformative social
effects.
The glue that binds institutional regimes to a system is a common source
of legitimacy for ordering multiple and frequently competing institutional
regimes." Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that legitimacy is foundational for
institutional regimes. Extending their argument, I suggest that systems comprise
institutional regimes that share a common source of legitimacy. This does not
mean that constituencies of a given institutional regime relinquish their claim to
self-ordering. It does, however, imply that they accept the terms on which their
relation with other institutional regimes will be determined. Put differently,
legitimacy assures compliance and third-party support not only for a given regime
but for the ordering of institutions within a system. The source of legitimacy
varies across systems and so does the priority given to some institutions over
others, which explains why what may look like similar institutions take on quite
different forms in different systems.
Max Weber distinguished different sources of legitimacy, such as
tradition, affect, value, rationality, faith, and legality Weber (1980).12 More
recently, social theorists have advanced the distinction between 'input' and
'output' sources of legitimacy, where input legitimacy refers to the process of
decision-making and output legitimacy to the effectiveness of delivering results
Scharpf (1999). Scharpf pointed out that the EU's emphasis on output legitimacy
seeks to dominate input legitimacy as the major source of legitimacy in
democratic nation states. In a similar vein, I suggest that transnational institutional
regimes also tend to emphasize output legitimacy. Given their narrow focus, they
are typically better at delivering on their promises than are complex systems of
social ordering. By the same token, they undermine the legitimacy of complex
systems of social ordering and the norms that sustain them, including due process
and equity.
The modern democratic nation state derives its legitimacy largely from
legality, that is, compliance with procedures, respect for constitutionally
enshrined rights and jurisdictional boundaries in the production and enforcement
of law across many areas of social ordering. Emphasis on procedure is not
necessarily empty formalism. Instead, procedures set the stage for contesting the
allocation or the enforcement of rights. Norms or institutions that are produced in
this fashion are accepted as binding, but can be contested within similar
procedural constraints that were observed in their production.
" Hadfield and Weingast Hadfield and Weingast (2011) use the term "common logic" to describe
a similar phenomenon. Specifically, they define a "common logic" as one that is accessible by all
actors, is stable over multiple time period, and can help determine a given performance vector.
12 See p. 36 in the English translation by Roth and Wittich, University of California Press, 1978.
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Identifying a common source of legitimacy does not rule out the co-
existence of others, or competition among them. As will be further discussed in
the next section, transnational property rights regimes frequently emphasize their
efficacy in promoting investment and trade, which are equated with economic
development prosperity. However, they also assert claims to property "rights" and
rule-based systems, suggesting the promotion of a specific regime may employ
more than one source of legitimacy: legality (input legitimacy) and effectiveness
(output legitimacy). Similarly, a system, even one with a universal claim to
legitimacy, such as the nation state, may tolerate multiple sub-systems with
independent sources of legitimacy within it. The universal Westphalian nation
state has never been quite as encompassing as its claim in the scope of social
ordering or the source of legitimacy for sub-systems within it. Institutional
regimes that pre-existed the nation state often continued to exist. Consider the
autonomy left to guilds, religious organizations, or stock exchanges within the
emergent nation state with different claims to legitimacy, such as religious
authority, adherence to qualifications as defined by a craft, or membership in a
trading club etc. New institutional regimes that derive their legitimacy from
sources other than the legality of the state have sprung up within the nation state.
Examples of new institutional regimes that challenge the scope of state ordering
include non-governmental or civil society organizations that derive their
legitimacy from their very status as outside of, and autonomous from, the state.
As long as institutional regimes endorse a system's common source of
legitimacy for determining their relation to other institutional regimes, even when
this conflicts with their own preferences, they remain an integral part of that
system. If and when this common source of legitimacy is openly challenged, the
relation becomes more tenuous; and when they claim that their source of
legitimacy is superior to that of legality, frictions occur that may weaken the
commonality of legality as a source of legitimacy. Put differently, institutional
regimes may weaken the legitimacy of existing systems not only by contesting a
particular form of ordering (as suggested by Streeck and Thelen), but by offering
alternative sources of legitimacy. This may, but need not, result in an explicit
change of existing institutions. The various modes of gradual institutional change
identified by Streeck and Thelen apply in this context. Neither does this
necessarily result in the demise of the system. It does, however, change the
relation between institutional regimes and the systems to which they relate.
Conversely, systems can and frequently do alter institutional regimes. By
subscribing to a given system's source of legitimacy, an institutional regime
becomes part of a larger field of contestation in which different institutional
regimes (and their stakeholders) compete with one another for primacy and
challenge the norms that justify a given prioritization. Compromises need to be
made to sustain the system, and this may change the scope and meaning of the
DOI: 10.2202/1934-2640.1391 10
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institutional regime that 'buys into' that system. Any international institutional
regime that needs the support of governments with strong veto powers will have
to tolerate modifications to the regime. Those modifications in turn alter the
institutional regime. As will be further discussed below, international norms
regarding the recognition of customary land use by indigenous people as property
rights were transposed into the constitutional framework of Belize by actions of
the country's supreme court. The precise scope of these rights and their relation
with competing claims within that country will ultimately shape the realization of
these norms within a complex social structure.
This account of institutional/system change emphasizes the ability of
actors to contest both the form institutions take and the norms that sustain them.
Contestation in this context does not necessarily mean open debates. Actions can
speak for themselves. As Hirschman (1970) has pointed out, members of
organizations often are unable to voice their preferences. As a result, their options
are limited to loyalty - i.e. acquiescence into existing arrangements whatever their
view on the legitimacy of such arrangements might be - or exit. Neither of these
options, however, is likely to result in changes within the system from which
these actors originate (or to which they are bound by loyalty) - lest the exit
triggers a response by actors within that system. Within the framework Platteau et
al. (2011) propose, a local judge charged with upholding local norms may alter
those norms or their enforcement in response to exit pressures.
In sum, in an attempt to develop a new synthesis between institutional and
system theories, I am suggesting to expand the Streeck/Thelen framework by
recognizing that systems are not closed, but open and malleable to change by
institutional regimes from both within and outside. In this conceptualization,
system change does not come necessarily from insurrectionists or other change
agents within a closed system. Neither does it come primarily or necessarily from
continuous contestation within a given institutional regime. Instead, it results from
the contestation over the systems' legitimacy. This framework does not eliminate
human agency. Instead, it situates human agency within multiple institutional
regimes where contestation takes place. Change agents are both more constrained
and more flexible than those envisioned by Mahoney and Thelen. They are more
constrained in that the change they seek to accomplish may be limited to a
particular institutional regime, which will translate into systemic change only if
and when they can challenge the system's source of legitimacy. That, however,
requires more than individual action.
The greater flexibility stems from the fact that in a world in which systems
are open, change agents can choose their space of contestation and influence
among different institutional regimes and the systems with which they are
associated. By exploiting this flexibility they can put pressure on multiple systems
and achieve more change than they would within a single closed system.
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Multinational corporations, self-regulating transnational organizations, as well as
NGOs have begun to exploit these possibilities as cosmopolitan agents of change.
Their ability to effect system change is ultimately contingent upon their ability to
change the perception of the system's legitimacy. This in turn requires that the
goals and means they pursue be open to and become a part of the process of
contesting norms, policies, and social goals within that system.
IV Transnational Property Rights Regimes: Two Case Studies
Property rights were chosen as the field of inquiry because of the paramount
importance attributed to them by institutional and social theories alike. Karl Marx
developed his theory of social change around the nature of property rights that
dominate agrarian, feudal, capitalist or socialist societies. Institutionalists,
particularly those of the economic stripe, have long argued that a clear allocation
of property rights and effective institutions to enforce property and contractual
rights are critical for economic development and growth. Property rights have also
taken center stage in economic and institutional reform projects, as evidenced by
extensive privatization programs since the 1980s not only in the former socialist
world, but in other emerging markets as well. Additionally, international law has
sought to strengthen property rights - whether those of indigenous people by way
of protecting their property rights as human rights, or by allowing foreign
investors to resolve property rights disputes with host countries in arbitration
tribunals outside their sphere of influence.
This paper uses contests over transnational property rights as a heuristic
device to explore the relation between institutional and system change. As the
discussion in the previous section suggests, it is not always easy to differentiate
between institutions and systems, between institutional change and system
change, or to stipulate how they relate to one another. Occasionally, institutional
and system change coincide. Revolutions tend to alter existing property rights
regimes while they also upend power relations and other foundations of the social
system Carruthers and Ariovich (2004). More frequently, property rights change
in a gradual fashion, which involves complex interactions between institutional
and system change. By locating property disputes in a transnational setting it is
possible to delineate more clearly the interaction between system and institutional
regime. Specifically, this section traces the impact of transnational property rights
regimes on national legal systems to see whether they create new space for
contestation within the receiving system. Admittedly, this particular framing
overstates both the importance of law as compared to other institutions and the
national system as target of change. However, it does have the advantage that it
utilizes processes of contestation can actually be observed as they are written up
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in legal opinions. It also facilitates the identification of boundaries between
institutional regimes and systems.
In accordance with the analytical framework developed in the previous
section, the transnational property rights regime can be defined as the space for
contesting norms that determine the allocation of property rights in an
international or transnational context. An international or bilateral treaty may
announce the norms that call on the state to protect certain property rights. In this
setting the state is both rule maker and rule taker, because it endorsed the norm in
an international treaty, and as a party to that treaty is also bound by it. Other
stakeholders are local and foreign stakeholders that are directly or indirectly
affected by the transnational regime. Those whose property rights are protected
can frequently contest infringements of these rights by state actors in a forum
outside that state. This procedural device tends to strengthen the protected right.
Whether or not it will have any impact on the system where the dispute
originated, however, will depend on whether the new institutional regime creates
a space for contestation within that system.
Many international norms, including those pertaining to property rights,
have been on the books for a long time. Several international legal instruments
declare the inalienability of property rights and affirm them as human rights.13
Similarly, the norm that property should not be expropriated without due
compensation has been recognized in multiple international legal instruments. In
the absence of a forum in which the scope of these norms could be established
and contested, however, they had the effect of mere proclamations. This changed
dramatically once an open forum for contesting such rights was established
outside the infringing state's boundaries. In the area of human rights, such
supranational tribunals are still rare - with the notable exception of the European
Court for Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and
a few other regional human rights tribunals.14
Private-state disputes have also become much more common in the
context of foreign investments. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become
the method of choice for foreign investors to charge host country governments
with expropriation in international arbitration tribunals. In both cases - human
rights and investor protection - the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms has
made the contents and scope of these norms contestable. This in turn has
mobilized other constituencies, such as lawyers or NGOs, to access this space, to
13 Including, but not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man by the Organization of American States, etc. Property rights are given the status of human
rights that can be expropriated only against just compensation.
" Powerful state interests have prevented similar tribunals from being established at the
international level.
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identify victims of violations of these transnational regimes and offer them
support for bringing suit and advocating a particular interpretation of the relevant
norms. In short, open contestability has created much more vibrant transnational
property rights regimes. It has also triggered responses by national legal systems
and in some cases has resulted in important and potentially system-transformative
changes within these systems.
These trends confirm the thesis advanced by Streeck and Thelen that
access to a forum for resolving disputes - whether a tribunal, committee or a court
- creates an open space for contestation where the interpretation of norms and
their application to different fact patterns can be interpreted, amended, and
changed over time. Two case studies are presented below to illuminate the
interaction between transnational property rights regimes and the domestic legal
systems with which they interface, and to investigate how the different manner of
contesting property rights has affected the domestic system and/or the
international institutional regime.
Human Rights as Enforceable Property Rights: The Case of Belize
The first case is a dispute between the indigenous people and the government of
Belize over the right of the government to grant concessions to corporations for
oil explorations over land on which the Maya live and which they use to sustain
themselves, without compensation. The legal dispute first arose in 1996, when the
Maya filed a petition to seek relief in the Belize constitutional court. This petition
never resulted in a full legal review, but was allowed in the words of the Supreme
Court of Belize to "inexplicably drop[...] out of sight".15 By denying contestation
(i.e. voice in Hirschman's (1970) terms) in the judicial system, the government
may have tried to pressure the Maya into submission. However, the transnational
property rights regime offered an alternative forum for contestation. With the
support of NGOs, including a human-rights clinic at the University of Arizona
Law School, the Maya filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR allows victims of human rights abuse in
any of the member states of the Organization of American States to bring a case
to its attention if these actions violate the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man. Before turning to the IACHR, claimants must have attempted to
exhaust domestic remedies. 16
In a lengthy report, the IACHR ruled in 2004 that the actions of the Belize
government violated the Maya property rights as protected by this Declaration.
Specifically, the IACHR stated that the rights protected "are not limited to those
15 S.Ct. Belize Claim 171/2007 at recital 16.
16 This requirement applies to human rights tribunals at the international level, but not to investor
disputes under NAFTA or most bilateral investment treaties.
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property interests that are already recognized by States or that are defined by
domestic law, but rather that the right to property has an autonomous meaning in
international human rights law" (emphasis added).17 This confirms the autonomy
of national law vis-a-vis the international legal system and the institutional
regimes it comprises. By implication, institutional regimes that are rooted in
international law - such as the protection of property rights - may differ from
those at the national level. It is therefore interesting to ask what effect a conflict
between international and domestic norms will have, how the conflict can be
resolved, and how the conflict resolution may affect the (domestic) system.
From a formal legal point of view the answer to this question depends on
whether or not a country accepts rulings of international tribunals or similar
bodies as exerting direct effect within its jurisdiction.18 Thus, it is possible, and
quite common, that a sovereign state is condemned by an international tribunal for
violating an international treaty, but that within that state plaintiffs are denied the
right to enforce norms of international law when they conflict with those of the
domestic system. A victory in an international tribunal therefore does not translate
immediately into a change in the domestic regime. That change needs to be fought
for within the constraints of the national regime. Nonetheless, as the present case
demonstrates, a victory in an international forum can shape the debate within the
national legal system and, importantly, persuade key actors to switch sides. As a
matter of formal law, therefore, the Maya's victory at the JACHR was not
sufficient to make any difference for the Maya in Belize. The government faced
moral sanctions for failing to follow the recommendations of the Commission;
not, however, legal enforcement.19 The Maya therefore turned once more to the
Supreme Court of Belize. The fact that they had won a legal case in a
supranational tribunal ultimately made a difference. This time, their petition was
not allowed to fizzle out, but resulted in a landmark ruling.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Maya held 'an interest' in the land on
which they live and, indeed, had lived long before Belize was colonized and
subsequently released into independence; and that interim changes of sovereignty
had had no effect on such rights. The Court was influenced in this ruling by the
Australian Case "Mabo v. Queensland",2 0 which had ruled in 1992 on a similar
matter with similar results. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Belize now
17 See Maya Indigenous communities v. Belize (2004) at recital 171.
1s Those countries are labeled "monists" in international law parlance, whereas countries that
require the transposition of international into domestic law as a prerequisite for its effect within
the domestic legal order are called "dualists".
19 These are largely absent in international law, and those that exist, such as resolutions of the UN
Security Council, have many strings attached to them. A partial exception to this rule is the
European Union, where the Commission is explicitly charged with the power to challenge the
failure of member states to transpose EU directives into national law.
20 Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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held that the extension of the Crown's sovereign power to new territories for the
purpose of settlement alone did not and could not deprive indigenous people of
their legal rights to the land absent an explicit act of Parliament to that effect. It
also argued that communal rights to ususfructus constituted property rights even
if similar practices may not be recognized as property rights by the common law.
And finally, the Supreme Court of Belize argued that these customary land rights
fall within the protection of property rights under the Constitution of Belize - i.e.
the domestic legal system, the interpretation of which falls within its jurisdiction.
The conceptual leap for recognizing customary land use practices as property
rights was anticipated by developments in international law, including a UN
declaration on the recognition of the rights of indigenous people,21 by the ruling
of the IACHR in this case, and by several national tribunals in countries such as
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.
The Supreme Court took pains to clarify that its primary task was to
interpret the Constitution, not to apply international norms.22 In fact, the
government as the defendant in the dispute reminded the Court that it "cannot
merely adopt any findings of facts and law made in another case unrelated to any
alleged breach of the provision of the Constitution" as such action would be "non-
justiciable."2 3 This reminder notwithstanding, the Court asserted its right to find
the pronouncements of the IACHR "persuasive" in light of the fact that Belize is a
member of the OAS and as such party to the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man. Indeed, on several occasions, the Court referred directly to the
Commission's report. After laying out its own argument based on evidence
established at trial that the Maya have an "interest" in the land in the form of
"customary land tenure" the Court stated that it was "fortified in this conclusion"
by the IACHR's report. Similarly, after asserting that this 'interest' constitutes a
property right that is protected by the Constitution of Belize, the Court once more
cited the IACHR's report and expressed satisfaction that it too had come to the
- 24 -- -same conclusion. Specifically, the Court pointed to the similarities in the
wording of the Belize Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man. The Court also made extensive references to decisions of the Privy
Council, including ones dating back to the heydays of the British colonial empire.
In these cases, the Privy Council had recognized customary law as property rights
worthy of protection notwithstanding the fact that the common law had a much
more individualist concept of property rights. References to these sources had
21 Such a declaration is technically non-binding, but can exert substantial normative appeal.
22 In Belize, as in many other countries, norms of international law are not immediately
enforceable as a matter of domestic law but require an active transposition into domestic law, and
are then enforceable as domestic, not as international law.
23 Written submission by the defendants as cited in Claim 171/2007 at para. 20.
2 4 bid at para. 100.
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important legitimating power for the ruling, as until 2010 the Privy Council was
Belize's court of last instance.2 5
Winning a court case is only the first step in effecting institutional change.
In this regard it is interesting to note that in Australia the Mabo case triggered a
legislative change - the Natives Title Act - that explicitly recognized customary
land use rights of indigenous people as property rights. This did not happen in
Belize, which suggests that the authority of the court, and arguably more
generally the power of law, differs in the two countries. In fact, the Belize
government continued to grant concessions for oil exploration in territories that
had not been made explicitly part of the original proceedings. The Maya therefore
sued again with many more tribes joining in the proceedings. In June 2010, the
Belize Supreme Court confirmed the findings of the 2007 ruling as to facts and
law. 2 6 This is unlikely to put the issue to rest - and indeed, the government
already announced its intention to appeal the ruling. If confirmed, it would force
the government to pay compensation for expropriating the Maya should it wish to
nationalize their land.27 Moreover, the ruling has forced the government to pursue
legal action in order to preserve its interests - an important contrast o the attempt
to simply suppress earlier attempts by the Maya to litigate their interests.
This case illustrates the complex interface between institutional regimes
and systems. The development of a transnational property rights regime that
recognized customary land rights as property rights under international law was
critical for the Maya to advance their case first in the IACHR and subsequently in
the Belize legal system. As noted, their first attempt to enforce their rights under
the Belize Constitution went nowhere. The political system had not changed
dramatically in the meantime. The major impetus for change came from
institutional regimes outside Belize, specifically from the increasing recognition
of (collective) customary land use practices a enforceable property rights. By
appealing to law and legality as the source of legitimacy for resolving the dispute,
the plaintiffs and their representatives created an opening for the Supreme Court
of Belize to follow international and foreign examples (not precedents in any
formal sense) and to embrace similar legal arguments, notwithstanding political
pressure to the contrary.
The victory in the Supreme Court of Belize cannot be attributed to a
hierarchical relation between international and national law. As explained above,
25 It is unclear whether the timing of this transfer of this authority from the Privy Council to the
Caribbean Court of Justice is related to the present case.
26 See Claim No. 366 of 2008 in the Supreme Court of Belize, between THE MAYA LEADERS
ALLIANCE and THE TOLEDO ALCALDES ASSOCIATION on behalf of the Maya villages of
Toledo District et al., and the Attorney General of Belize and the Minister of Natural Resources
and Environment, 28 June 2010, available at
htto://www.belizelaw.org/suremne court/judgements/.
27 Palacio (2009).
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such a relation does not exist. It would therefore have been perfectly legal for the
Court to ignore the findings of the IACHR entirely. Instead, it chose to endorse as
"persuasive" the arguments advanced by the transnational tribunal and developed
parallel arguments using authoritative sources within its own system, including
decisions of the Privy Council, to justify them. The Court also reminded the
government that it had by its own choice ratified international treaties that made
Belize part of an international order with norms and principles (i.e. institutional
regimes) which - even if they can't exert direct effect under domestic law - the
government should not willfully ignore.
The government may not have anticipated that these international norms
would carry teeth once enforcement procedures were created, and that
constituencies beyond its reach, such as international NGOs, or clinics of foreign
law schools28 with legal and financial resources, would begin to populate this new
space of contestation. The landmark rulings by the Supreme Court of Belize not
only fortified legal principles about the property rights of indigenous people that
had first been developed outside its jurisdiction. Moreover, because the Court
derived its conclusions from an interpretation of the Belize Constitution, i.e.
domestic law, it created within the domestic legal system an opening for
contesting property rights - and possibly other rights - that did not exist before.
Local Land Use Rules and NAFTA
The second case study addresses the question of local land use rules and their
interface with the North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA created a free
trade zone between Canada, Mexico and the United States. It established state-to-
state arbitration, but also allows investors to bring a case against a foreign host
state if alleging expropriation without compensation, or unfair or discriminatory
treatment. These 'chapter 11 proceedings' have been more widely used than
anticipated29 and have raised important issues about how this transnational regime
and its interpretation affect the domestic legal systems of NAFTA member states.
The government of the host country can be held liable even if under domestic law
it does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. In fact, NAFTA cases have
done just that - and ironically in cases where the central government was trying to
promote the foreign investments, but local governments opposed it.30
28 The University of Arizona Law School's faculty and students helped prepare the case. See
1_/ (last visited 13 December 2010).
29For a survey of the evolution of BITs and the introduction of state-investor dispute settlement
mechanisms, see Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2004).
30 For a review of these cases see Olsen (2007).
DOI: 10.2202/1934-2640.1391 18
Pistor: Contesting Property Rights
One of the best-known NAFTA cases is Metalclad.3 1 It involves an
American company that acquired a Mexican firm, Coterin, which had earlier
received an approval from the federal government to build a hazardous waste
landfill in the state of San Luis Potosi. While governmental agents at the federal
level reassured Metalclad and its Mexican subsidiary that the investment would
go forward, the municipality of Guadalcazar denied approval for operating the
venture and ordered the closure of the already completed site. The reason given
was that the waste landfill was in violation of local zoning rules and
environmental regulations. Metalclad chose not to refer the case to Mexican
courts, but directly to a NAFTA tribunal. Unlike many transnational human rights
regimes - such as the ECHR - NAFTA does not require that the foreign investor
first exhaust domestic remedies before filing with an international tribunal. This
design of the procedure for contesting property rights was motivated by fears that
local courts would side with local governments and that a requirement to first
exhaust local remedies might de facto result in the denial of remedies.3 2
The arbitral tribunal in the Metalclad case ruled that the actions of the
local government constituted both expropriation and unfair treatment of the
foreign investors, and therefore condemned the Mexican government to pay
compensation in the amount of US $16.5 mln - the amount Metalclad had
invested in the project. The Supreme Court of British Columbia reversed some
findings of the tribunal, but did not fully set aside the case.33
The tribunal's ruling is remarkable not only for its outcome, but also for
its reasoning. The first step the tribunal took was to embed NAFTA, the tribunal
and the ruling firmly in general principles of international law. Specifically, the
tribunal invoked the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates
that a party to an international treaty may not invoke provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform the treaty (Art. 27). Based on these
general principles derived from the system of international law, the tribunal ruled
that the Mexican government is responsible for actions taken by the municipality,
should they be deemed in violation of NAFTA. Note that such an interpretation is
not inevitable. It is by no means clear that the parties to NAFTA had agreed to set
31 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1 under the auspices
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility) of 30
August 2000.
32 A similar argument could equally be made for human rights, but in this area governments have
been far less forthcoming in softening their stance on state sovereignty. Whether they knew what
they were doing when they signed off to investor-state arbitration clauses in bilateral investment
treaties or NAFTA is not quite clear. However, it is probably fair to say that they did not expect o
be subjected to legal challenges to the extent they have been. On the development of disputes
under BITs see Peterson (2004).
33 For details, see The Supreme Court of British Columbia, The United Mexican States vs.
Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664.
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aside principles of their internal organization - i.e. federalism - in favor of
protecting the rights and interests of foreign investors. It would therefore have
been equally opportune to interpret the scope of investor rights in light of the
domestic competences of the member states. The tribunal does not even discuss
this possibility and instead seeks legitimacy by reference to a general treaty, to
which, ironically, the US is not even a party.
The tribunal then proceeded to interpret the two NAFTA provisions at
stake, Article 1105 on fair and equitable treatment, and Article 1110 on
expropriation.34 Both provisions refer to the protection of investments, but
NAFTA itself does not give a precise definition of the term. In interpreting the
provisions of the Treaty, the tribunal referred to its general purpose - i.e. the
protection of investors. It thus treats NAFTA as an autonomous institutional
regime - not as part of a larger domestic or international system where it might
compete with equally legitimate, and legally grounded, claims. Given the scope of
investor protection and the powerful enforcement apparatus, this interpretation
effectively positions the rights of foreign investors over and above competing
claims of domestic constituencies, including those of domestic investors.
The tribunal's arguments are perfectly in line with theories that view
actors' response to institutions as the major mechanism to achieve social change.
By imposing liability on states the regime is expected to deter similar actions in
the future. This in turn should enhance the protection of property rights and
thereby generate more foreign investment, which is arguably an important
determinant of economic development Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006). This
argument ignores legitimate competing interests within the domestic regime and
thereby de-legitimizes the NAFTA property rights regime in its member states.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that NAFTA should adopt a
"balancing test" similar to the one employed by US courts, which looks not only
into the interest that is violated - which incidentally must reach the level of
"distinct investment-backed expectations"3 5 - but also into the economic impact
and character of the regulation. The Treaty itself does not specify what tests
tribunals or courts should employ in interpreting its meaning. Neither, of course,
do most national constitutions. However, national courts tend to interpret their
constitutions within a broader context of legal rights and competing interests. In
contrast, NAFTA tribunals are free of such broader concerns.
3 Article 1105 reads in its relevant parts: ".... Each Party shall accord to investments of investors
of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection of security." And Art. 1110 provides that "no party shall directly or
indirectly.... Expropriate an investment .... or take a measure tantamount to ... expropriation ...
except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due
process of law and Article 1105 (1)."
35 See Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) as cited in Olsen
supra note 33 at 61.
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Indeed, the tribunal condemned the Mexican government for a general
failure in administering its internal affairs and explained that the asserted
violation of Art. 1105 of NAFTA stemmed from "the absence of a clear rule as to
the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit, as well as the absence
of any established practice or procedure as to the manner of handling applications
36 - --for a municipal construction permit". Similarly, the expropriation claim was
sustained based on the argument that the Mexican government "permitted or
tolerated the conduct of Guadalcazar in relation to Metalclad" and that it
effectively "acquiesced in the denial of Metalclad of the right to operate the
landfill".37 In fact, the federal government sided with Metalclad throughout the
dispute.
According to the tribunal, NAFTA serves the single purpose of protecting
the expectations of investors. The tribunal cannot change domestic law, but it can
hold governments liable for the failure by any state agent to grant the protection to
investors that NAFTA requires. This may, over time, have an effect on the
operation of the domestic legal system. Specifically, a federal government faced
with liability for millions, if not hundreds of millions, of dollars may want to pass
the costs for violation of NAFTA to those it deems responsible for it. This could
result in a reconfiguration of rights and responsibilities in a federal system (Olsen,
2007).
Unlike in the Belize case discussed above, a domestic court never got
involved in adjudicating whether the actions of the municipality did indeed
amount to a violation of property rights under Mexican law. NAFTA gives
investors the option to go directly to outside tribunals that have the power to grant
them monetary relief against the host state. There is therefore no need to re-
litigate them domestically. By the same token, there are no mechanisms by which
the normative conclusions of the case are transposed into national law or by
which the findings of the tribunal would be contested within the domestic legal
system. Instead, by imposing liabilities on sovereign states, it is expected that
state agents will eventually comply with these norms in order to avoid future
liability. Thus, deterrence shall serve as a substitute for legitimacy,38 and foreign
investment flows shall compensate for violating principles of federalism under
domestic law. There is little research as of now into the effects of tribunal
decisions on domestic legal systems, either in NAFTA or in the context of
bilateral investment treaties more generally. I would venture to suggest that we
should not expect much change, because it is by no means clear that the mere
threat of future liability is sufficient to change domestic attitudes or behavior.
36 Metalclad v. Mexico, supra note 34, at recital 88.
37 Ibid at recital 104.
38 That, obviously, is the gist of much of the law and economics literature on the design of optimal
sanctions going back to Becker's famous paper on crime and punishment. Becker (1968)
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That would require the contestation of the relevant norms within the domestic
system with competing interests given a chance to be voiced.
The current framework suggests one of two outcomes: Sovereign states
will reign in the scope of investor rights either in substance or with respect to the
remedies they can seek in transnational tribunals. This is indeed now widely
discussed, including in the US, which has advocated a more narrow reading of
investor protection both in NAFTA and in its model BIT. The alternative is to
continue to strengthen investor rights in outsourced tribunals and levy domestic
governments with liabilities sufficiently large to alter behavior. That could have
the unintended effect of accelerating the backlash against the transnational
regime. However, it might further weaken the ability of states to mitigate
competing claims domestically and thereby accelerate the particularization of
institutional regimes.
Comparative Analysis
What lessons can be drawn from comparing these two cases about the interface of
institutional regimes and social systems? In both scenarios, a transnational
property rights regime provided a new space for contesting the scope of protection
that a legal system does or should afford to certain interests. The mere
pronouncement of such rules in international law never had the same effect. The
establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms outside the sovereign's reach was
critical - and so was the discovery of these mechanisms by international NGOs,
law firms, and other norm entrepreneurs. However, the nature of the contestation
and its repercussions for the legal systems with which this new transnational
regime interacts is determined not only by the design of the contestable space, but
also by the remedies available to the tribunal. This is apparent when comparing
Metalclad with the IACHR's report on the Belize government with respect to the
property rights claims of the Maya. The IACHR judiciously focused on violations
of international law. It condemned the government of Belize. However, by
institutional design it could not offer remedies other than recommending to the
government what measures to take to ensure compliance with international law.
Specifically, the IACHR asked the government of Belize to
adopt in its domestic law, and through fully informed consultations with
the Maya people, the legislative, administrative, and other measures
necessary to delimit, demarcate, and title or otherwise clarify and protect
the territory in which the Maya people have communal property rights, in
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accordance with their customary land use practices, and without detriment
to other indigenous communities."
The IACHR has no means at its disposal to compel a government to take
such action. Neither, however, has a domestic court. Being condemned by its own
judiciary, however, is more likely to force government to respond. This is so
because failure to respond may have the unintended consequence of undermining
a critical source of legitimacy - legality - which even a government with a record
of human rights violations may find indispensable for preserving its rule. For this
reason, the fact that the government considered appealing the 2010 ruling of the
Supreme Court amounts to a partial victory of the transnational property rights
regime. Even if not upheld, shifting the disputes into the courts has helped
legitimize law as a means of social ordering.
In contrast, arbitration tribunals under NAFTA can require that
governments fully compensate investors for damages inflicted. While it may be
the case that governments that are held liable will try to roll over some of the
costs to those within the state apparatus who caused the damage, this is not
inevitable. Especially in a federal system, it would require major changes to the
prevailing legal and fiscal systems. More importantly, such a move may be
deemed illegitimate by constituencies within that country. Studies about the effect
of NAFTA rulings, or similar decisions under bilateral investment treaties, on
changes in government conduct or formal allocations of responsibility are rare. So
far, there is little evidence that outsourcing dispute settlement and establishing a
parallel transnational property rights regime has had much impact on domestic
regimes.
The major reason appears to be that they lack the legitimacy associated
with the domestic legal system, which would require contestation within that
system. Tribunals have not been completely oblivious to such requests. While
causal connections are difficult to establish, one could make a claim that a recent
case that resembled Metalclad in many respects not only resulted in the denial of
the claim, but in a ruling that the plaintiff had to reimburse the US government for
40part of its legal expenses. It remains to be seen whether tribunals can preempt
more far-reaching interventions by the affected sovereign states to curtail their
powers under NAFTA by taming their rulings and signaling a greater willingness
to consider that law and legal systems serve more than one constituency. That, of
course, would transform the transnational property rights regime from an
autonomous external regime into one that situates itself more closely within
competing institutional regimes. This would inevitably weaken the scope of the
3 IACHR Report no. 40/04. Case 12/ 053 at recital 197.1.
0 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID, June 8 2009.
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property rights protection currently afforded investors, but might enhance its
legitimacy - and thus its sustainability.
V Concluding Comments
This paper has advanced the argument that absent a better understanding of how
institutions relate to systems, it is difficult to make predictions about the impact of
specific institutional change. The importance of the 'context' of institutions,
which many literatures on institutionalism have begun to stress, is based on
similar premises. Context can be defined more broadly as the system in which
institutions are situated or with which they interact. A system in turn comprises
those institutional regimes that share a common source of legitimacy. An
institutional regime can develop outside a given system - but its impact on a
system, i.e. its relation to other spaces of contestation within that system, depends
on the nature of the interface between institutional regimes and systems.
This paper discussed two case studies to illustrate different ways in which
institutional regimes that are rooted in international law interface with domestic
legal systems. In one case, emergent international norms were transposed into the
domestic legal system by contesting the scope of domestic property rights against
the backdrop of an emergent global regime. In the other case, a regime was
created that operates quasi autonomously from the domestic systems that are
affected by it. In neither case did the transnational regime create swift change.
However, in the first scenario it set into motion a process of potentially
transformative institutional change, as domestic courts began to embrace norms
that first emerged in the transnational context and lent them legitimacy by rooting
them in the domestic legal order. In contrast, the transnational investor rights
regime operates outside domestic legal orders. This has great advantages for
resolving individual property rights disputes swiftly. However, it can also
delegitimize both the transnational institutional regime and the domestic legal
system: the transnational regime because it lacks a common source of legitimacy;
the domestic system because its authority for social ordering is undermined. This
argument has potentially far reaching implications for strategies that advocate the
outsourcing of dispute settlement in order to enhance "efficiency" Dammann and
Hansmann (2008). Such a trend is noticeable not only in the transnational arena,
but also in domestic legal systems in the form or arbitration and other
"alternative" forms of dispute resolution. To the extent these become exclusive
legal orders for particularized interests, they may erode common sources of
legitimacy on which a broader legal system rests. Such a system, however, is
needed to provide a space for contesting priorities among competing regimes.
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